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Abstract
This article explores our experiences of conducting feminist interpretive research on the British Army
Reserves. The project, which examined the everyday work-Army-life balance challenges that reservists
face, and the roles of their partners/spouses in enabling them to fulfil their military commitments, is an
example of a potential contribution to the so-called ‘knowledge economy’, where publicly funded research
has come to be seen as ‘functional’ for political, military, economic, and social advancement. As feminist
interpretive researchers examining an institution that prizes masculinist and functionalist methodologies,
instrumentalised knowledge production, and highly formalised ethics approval processes, we faced multiple
challenges to how we were able to conduct our research, who we were able to access, and what we were able
to say. We show how military assumptions about what constitutes proper ‘research’, bolstered by knowledge
economy logics, reinforces gendered power relationships that keep hidden the significant roles women (in
our case, the partners/spouses of reservists) play in state security. Accordingly, we argue that the function-
alist and masculinist logics interpretive researchers face in the age of the knowledge economy help more in
sustaining orthodox modes of knowledge production about militaries and security, and in reinforcing gen-
dered power relations, than they do in advancing knowledge.
Keywords: Research Ethics; Military Policy; Gatekeeping; Knowledge Economy; Impact Agenda; Feminist and Interpretive
Methodology
Introduction
The circumstances under which academics produce knowledge, and how and why certain modes
of knowledge become valued over others, has long interested International Relations (IR)
scholars.1 While research expertise is under fire from ‘fake news’ and anti-intellectual strains
of populism, knowledge has always played an important role in human advancement. Faced
with increasing deindustrialisation and greater outsourcing of manufacturing and service jobs
to developing economies, many governments in the Global North have come to believe that con-
tinued economic prosperity will come from growing their ‘knowledge economies’.2 This term,
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British International Studies Association. This is an Open
Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which
permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, ‘On the subject matter of International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 43:5
(2017), pp. 898–917; Berit Blieseman de Guevara and Roland Kostić, ‘Knowledge production in/about conflict and interven-
tion: finding “facts”, telling “trust”’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11:1 (2017), pp. 1–20; Edward Said,
Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994).
2Andrew Gunn and Michael Mintrom, ‘Higher education policy change in Europe: Academic research funding and the
impact agenda’, European Education, 48:4 (2016), pp. 241–57.
























































































































while often over-used and ill defined,3 broadly refers to the idea that knowledge, conceived of as
‘creative problem-solving’, has utility that drives economic development.4 In the context of the
knowledge economy, universities have become producers of entrepreneurial knowledge; UK
universities have been described by the government as ‘powerhouses’ that ‘create the knowledge,
capability and expertise that drive competitiveness’.5
This commodification of knowledge means research is now expected to ‘add value’, to have
utility beyond academia.6 British Research funding councils have also been awarded additional
funds to boost government, industry, and academic cooperation to develop ‘the next generation
of innovators’,7 leading them to become fixated on evaluating, measuring, and monitoring
research utility.8 One of the ways that the utility of research is evaluated and measured is through
‘impact case studies’, which now inform a large part of the prestige and public funding awarded
to British universities and so increasingly determine what types of research are valued.9 Research
does not occur in ‘apolitical vacuums’ and particular forms of ‘research productivity’ tend to be
consequently rewarded.10
By subjecting researchers to ‘impact agendas’,11 funders have created an imperative for them to
demonstrate that their research has some utility and value in the ‘real world’.12 In 2014, we, and
three other UK-based research teams, were awarded public funding amounting to £1.35 million to
carry out ‘impactful’ research,13 which would ‘help inform some of the pressing issues facing the
armed forces in the process of integrating regular and reserve components into a “Whole Force” struc-
ture’.14 These four funded projects became collectively known as the Future Reserves Research
Programme (FRRP). Co-funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Ministry of
Defence (MoD) and BritishArmy, our three-year research project aimed to examine howArmy reser-
vists – the majority of whom are men in relationships with women – balance their work-Army-life
commitments.15 We also examined the role of reservists’ women partners/spouses in facilitating
this balance, and the implications for them of reservists having to juggle multiple roles under the
MoD’s plans to rely more heavily on reservists to fulfil UK military objectives than previously.16
As IR scholars, our intellectual interest in the FRRP was that the UK’s defence restructuring
plans were occurring in a highly politicised context of public spending cuts justified by global
financial recession, and in changing geopolitical circumstances in which the UK’s military and
3David Mills and Richard Ratcliffe, ‘After method? Ethnography in the knowledge economy’, Qualitative Research, 12:2
(2012), pp. 147–64.
4Gunn and Mintrom, ‘Higher education policy change in Europe’, p. 243.
5Jo Johnson, in Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Success as a Knowledge Economy: Teaching Excellence,
Social Mobility & Student Choice Cm 9258 (London: TSO, 2016), p. 5.
6Mills and Ratcliffe, ‘After method?’, p. 151, emphasis in original.
7HM Government, Information Economy Strategy (London: TSO, 2013).
8Richard Watermeyer, ‘Impact in the REF: Issues and obstacles’, Studies in Higher Education, 41:2 (2016), pp. 199–214.
9David Blagden, ‘Politics, policy and the UK impact agenda: The promise and pitfalls of academic engagement with
government’, International Studies Perspectives, 20:1 (2019), pp. 84–111.
10Kathleen M. Blee and Ashley Currier, ‘Ethics beyond the IRB: An introductory essay’, Qualitative Sociology, 34:3 (2011),
pp. 401–13 (p. 407).
11Gunn and Mintrom, ‘Higher education policy change in Europe’.
12Demonstrating impact is now required to receive public funds in multiple countries. See Jennifer Chubb and Richard
Watermeyer, ‘Artifice or integrity in the marketization of research impact? Investigating the moral economy of (pathways
to) impact statements within research funding proposals in the UK and Australia’, Studies in Higher Education, 42:12
(2017), pp. 2360–72; Francis Gavin, ‘Policy and the publically-minded professor’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:1–2
(2017), pp. 269–74.
13Total programme funds consisted of £600,000 funding from the ESRC, £600,000 from the MoD, and £150,000 from the
Army.
14ESRC, Future of the Armed Forces: Understanding Issues around Integration of Regular and Reserve Personnel Call
Specification (Swindon: ESRC, 2014), p. 2.
15MoD, UK Armed Forces Biannual Diversity Statistics 1 October 2019 (London: MoD, 2019).
16MoD, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued Cm 8655 (London: MoD, 2013).























































































































foreign policy goals were being questioned.17 This intellectual curiosity was accompanied how-
ever, by the growing pressure on us to demonstrate the value and ‘impact’ of our work beyond
academia. As interpretive researchers, we make knowledge claims about the ‘social existence of
others’ that are not readily amenable to the evaluation, measuring, and monitoring often required
to easily demonstrate research impact and utility.18 We were therefore surprised that our project,
and some of the other projects with interpretive-qualitative components, were funded by the
FRRP, given strong preferences towards positivist/quantitative studies among policymakers.
Our success might also be attributed to the fact that our pathways to impact statement may
have slightly exaggerated the impact prospects of our research. Jennifer Chubb and Richard
Watermeyer, who locate the requirement to produce pathways to impact statements in the
knowledge economy, argue that many prospective researchers are susceptible to such ‘impact
sensationalism and hyperbole’ in order to win the increasingly diminishing public funding avail-
able to academics.19 What will become apparent below is that the knowledge economy is the
motive for why functionalist research is privileged and the impact agenda is the means by
which functionalist research is often privileged.
While cognisant of critiques of the impact agenda, we saw the FRRP as an opportunity to work
with MoD and Army stakeholders to potentially influence defence policy through insights drawn
from the everyday lives of those most affected by it, namely reservists and their family members.
We began the research optimistic about the knowledge we would produce through our direct
access to reservists and their spouses/partners, afforded to us by conducting publicly funded
research with the direct support of the MoD and Army. We were well-aware that the secretive
nature of the military as a core institution of the security state means that, ‘military-social scien-
tific collaboration or interaction’ is often the only way to access primary and/or secondary data on
the military,20 and that such collaboration requires cooperating with military gatekeepers, who
due to the ‘total’,21 and significantly hierarchical, nature of the military will likely have substantial
influence in forging the direction in which research develops.22 As recipients of FRRP funding we
saw ourselves as having been afforded a seat at a table where we would have to negotiate such
hierarchies to conduct our research. However, we also hoped to sit at a table alongside stake-
holders with a clear interest in facilitating our project and in learning from us as researchers.
It soon became apparent that this was not the case.
A key strength of our interpretive approach was that it would allow us to explore reservists’ and
their spouse/partners’ personal experiences of military transformation and to trace what modes of
sense-making were ‘culturally available’ to them. Interpretive research can provide rich, contex-
tualised data that enhance our understanding of the ‘latent, underlying or nonobvious issues’ that
often occur within social and political settings.23 If we had instead prioritised what could be read-
ily evaluated, measured, and monitored, as the MoD arguably already does through its annual
Reserves Continuous Attitudes Survey (RESCAS), we would have reinforced the idea that policy-
makers are best placed to identify the most pertinent issues, arguably undermining the rationale
for funding our project.24 We would have been less able to understand how the lived experiences
17HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7948
(London: TSO, 2010).
18Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland, Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices (London: Sage, 2002), p. 105.
19Chubb and Watermeyer, ‘Artifice or integrity’, p. 2364.
20Matthew F. Rech, ‘An introduction to military research methods’, in Matthew F. Rech, K. Neil Jenkings, Alison
J. Williams and Rachel Woodward (eds), The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods (London: Routledge,
2016), pp. 1–17 (pp. 6–7).
21Erving Goffman, Asylums (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961).
22Rech, ‘An introduction’, pp. 6–7.
23Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (London: Sage, 1994),
p. 10.
24David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction (London: Sage, 1993).























































































































of reservists and their motivations to serve compare and contrast with the conceptions that pol-
icymakers have of these.25 As Matthew F. Rech et al. caution, however, cooperation between social
scientists and security institutions may necessitate assenting to the latter’s ‘definitions of accept-
able methodologies’ and ‘conceptualisations of the social world’, which often validate the idea
that military research should befit a wider national interest rationale.26 We soon realised that
we had very different ideas from our military stakeholders about why researching the lives of
reservists and their family members mattered, about how the research should be conducted,
and about whose voices provide better understanding of the implications of military transform-
ation. Ultimately, this determined what knowledge we could produce and communicate to others
during the lifetime of the FRRP. By reflecting on the why, how, who, and what of the research
process below, we contend that the challenges that we faced during the project are best explained
as having been shaped by functionalist and masculinist logics that pervade both the military and
the knowledge economy. These made our research, and its value, intelligible in specific and limit-
ing ways.
We begin by focusing on the challenges that can arise when members of a research programme
have divergent agendas as to why the research is necessary and who it should primarily benefit.
We explore how positivist and functionalist logics suffuse military research and the impact
agenda, favouring instrumentalised knowledge over other forms, including interpretive and
feminist-inspired research like ours, which seeks to generate knowledge from people’s everyday
lives to better understand their relationship to (geo)political phenomena.27 We then turn to
how the research was conducted and the masculinist politics of methodology that pervades IR,
military ethics committees, and defence communities. Linked to this we examine the various bar-
riers we faced as a result of having to rely on ‘gatekeepers’ to access our research participants,
which shaped who was accessible to us as researchers external to the military. This highlighted
how the marginalisation of women’s voices can result from masculinist assumptions about
which topics and modes of inquiry are deemed ‘legitimate’. Finally, we ponder what knowledge
we could produce as a result of our collaboration with the MoD and British Army and what we
could subsequently communicate about our findings.
This article acts as a cautionary tale for those planning to research the security state but also
constitutes an invitation to do so. Given that our project was heavily influenced by MoD stake-
holder collaboration, we are able to offer detailed insights into the kinds of interactions that can
take place between social science and public policy, and thus into the pitfalls and opportunities of
this, something that warrants systematic academic inquiry.28 By centring our experiences of
researching a timely policy issue in the context of the knowledge economy, we aim to show
how gendered power relations, and orthodox knowledge about militaries and security, are (re)
produced. We conclude that functionalist and masculinist logics must be scrutinised and chal-
lenged to advance complex experiential knowledge of the military, which could greatly enrich
international studies.
25Victoria M. Basham and Sergio Catignani, ‘War is where the hearth is: Gendered labor and the everyday reproduction of
the geopolitical in the army reserves’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20:2 (2018), pp. 153–71; Stephen Gibson and
Jackie Abell, ‘For Queen and country? National frames of reference in the talk of soldiers in England’, Human Relations,
57:7 (2004), pp. 871–91; Miles and Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis; Rachel Woodward, ‘“Not for Queen and country
or any of that shit…”’, in Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert (eds), War, Citizenship, Territory (London: Routledge, 2007),
pp. 363–84.
26Rech, ‘An introduction’, pp. 6–7.
27Sandra G. Harding, Whose Knowledge? Whose Science? Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991).
28Sarah Parry and Joseph Murphy, ‘Problematizing interactions between social science and public policy’, Critical Policy
Studies, 9:1 (2015), pp. 97–107 (p. 104).























































































































Why research military transformation? Functionalist vs enlightenment approaches
The study of military institutions and civil-military relations has been principally dictated by
functionalist rather than enlightenment approaches.29 Functionalist approaches concentrate on
producing knowledge of benefit to the military, whereas enlightenment approaches seek to
advance scholarly knowledge of the military. The favouring of functionalist research by govern-
ment and military officials arises not only from it being conducted with a view to benefit the
security state but also because such officials tend to prefer what they often perceive as more clear-
cut, generalisable (usually quantitative) data that can be readily operationalised as policy.
Research seeking to produce knowledge about, rather than for, the state can conversely often
shed critical light on the state’s policies and practices, making it harder to operationalise.30
The effect of this, especially in an environment where knowledge is seen as a commodity to
trade with public officials or private industry, can be the dismissal of critical scholarship as
lacking clear value or as merely antagonistic, constraining its impact and perceived value to
the knowledge economy.31
The preference for easily applicable data among state and military officials often makes them
doubtful of more experiential, particularly feminist, approaches. Whereas feminist research often
aims to generate knowledge from and about everyday – and often underexplored – settings
because women have historically been less visible in the public sphere,32 militaries have long
exploited the divide between public and private life33 in highly heteronormative, gendered, and
gendering ways to utilise women’s private and men’s public labours.34 The public/private divide
has marginalised women’s experiences by obscuring actions that arise ‘within the feminised
psycho-social and physical spaces of privacy’, allowing men to wield power over women without
repercussion.35 Space, including the military home, is therefore permeated ‘with power and
politics, constructed by, and in turn constitutive of, social relations’.36
For many feminists, social reality and our knowledge about it are situated in experience (inter-
pretivism),37 so one must reject the notion that researchers are somehow outside or above that
social experience (positivism). Feminist IR scholars have accordingly demonstrated that focusing
on people’s experiences, and how they are mediated by gendered, racialised, socioeconomic, and
other power relations, tells us much about the international.38 The situatedness of subjects and
knowledge embraced by feminists often proves uncomfortable for policymakers precisely because
it refuses any certainty that there can be ‘complete truth, objectivity or self-knowledge’, while also
29Paul Higate and Ailsa Cameron, ‘Reflexivity and researching the military’, Armed Forces and Society, 32:2 (2006),
pp. 219–33; Eric Ouellet (ed.), New Directions in Military Sociology (Whitby, ON: de Sitter, 2005).
30Tim Hope and Reece Walters, Critical Thinking about the Uses of Research (London: Centre for Crime and Justice
Studies, 2008).
31Mark Hayes, ‘The ESRC university project on “dissident” Irish republicanism: Some reflections on the relationship
between research, academia, and the security state’, Contemporary Social Science, 15:2 (2018), pp. 1–21.
32J. Ann Tickner, ‘What is your research program? Some feminist answers to International Relations methodological ques-
tions’, International Studies Quarterly, 49:1 (2005), pp. 1–21.
33Harriet Gray, ‘Domestic abuse and the public/private divide in the British military’, Gender, Place and Culture, 23:6
(2016), pp. 912–25.
34Nancy Duncan (ed.), ‘Renegotiating gender and sexuality in public and private space’, in Bodyspace: Destabilising
Geographies and Gender and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 127–69; Susan Gal, ‘A semiotics of the public/private
distinction’, differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 13:1 (2002), pp. 77–95.
35Gray, ‘Domestic abuse’, p. 915.
36Ibid., p. 914.
37Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991); Sandra
G. Harding, Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987).
38Catherine Eschle, ‘Feminist studies of globalisation: Beyond gender, beyond economism?’, Global Society, 18:2 (2004),
pp. 97–125; Swati Parashar, J. Ann Tickner, and Jacqui True (eds), Revisiting Gendered States: Feminist Imaginings of the
State in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).























































































































promoting normative political interventions into those social forces.39 The feminist case for situ-
ated knowledge is animated by the fact that claims to objectivity and generalisability are, in prac-
tice, rarely cognisant of the prioritisation of the masculinised ways of experiencing and seeing the
world that underpin them. Hostility towards experiential research and the favouring of function-
alism can therefore retrench masculinist modes of knowledge production,40 and perpetuate
masculinist modes of social relations.41
It was clear from the funding call for the FRRP that the hoped-for outcome was that the three-
year programme would inform military policies regarding the Future Reserves 2020 (FR2020)
transformation programme and especially help the armed forces overcome the recruitment,
retention, and integration challenges it posed through empirically grounded research.42 Given
that prior research has shown that family support is a key determinant of retention,43 we sought
to explore what role family members, especially reservists’ partners/spouses, have in enabling
reservists serve in the Army Reserves. We sought to build on feminist work on militaries that
highlights how the ‘ordinary, domestic and intimate spaces so often occupied by women have
remained understudied’,44 and offer up original insights into ‘the interactive and entangled nature
of domestic life and geopolitics’.45
Such aims, we believed, were consistent with the ESRC’s impact agenda, which presses social
scientists into proving that their publicly funded research projects make a ‘demonstrable contri-
bution … to society and the economy’, particularly by encouraging engagement with stake-
holders.46 To secure public funding, we had to write a ‘pathways to impact plan’ with such
potential stakeholders in mind. We were required to outline the detailed steps we intended to
take in order to, among other things: (1) establish ‘networks and relationships with research
users’, that is, stakeholders; (2) involve ‘users at all stages of the research’; and (3) develop
‘good understanding of policy/practice contexts [thus] encouraging users to bring knowledge
of context to research’.47 While these expectations could permit a range of interactions between
researchers and stakeholders, the ESRC call specification expected our research inter alia, ‘to
inform personnel and training policies’ and that the pathways to impact would provide ‘evidence
of … engagement and dissemination plans to maximise … the potential benefits to defence and
national security capability’.48
While what constitutes impactful research is not always so prescriptive, the impact agenda
raises important questions about why knowledge is produced and to what ends, especially
given that not all researchers can establish relationships with research users and stakeholders
on equal terms. It can be harder for example, for those with disabilities and/or caring
39Lise Nelson, ‘Bodies (and spaces) do matter: The limits of performativity’, Gender, Place & Culture, 6:4 (1999), pp. 331–
53 (p. 349).
40Sandra Harding, Sciences from Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2008).
41On how reserve service perpetuates such masculinist modes of social relations, see Sergio Catignani and Victoria
M. Basham, ‘Reproducing the military and heteropatriarchal normal: Army Reserve service as serious leisure’, Security
Dialogue (2020), available at: {doi: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010620923969} accessed on 17
October 2020.
42ESRC, Future of the Armed Forces.
43Chris Bourg and Maddy W. Segal, ‘The impact of family supportive policies and practices on organizational commit-
ment to the Army’, Armed Forces and Society, 25:4 (1999), pp. 633–52.
44Marsha Henry and Katherine Natanel, ‘Militarisation as diffusion: The politics of gender, space and the everyday’,
Gender, Place and Culture, 23:6 (2016), pp. 850–6 (p. 852).
45Katherine Brickell, ‘Geopolitics of home’, Geography Compass, 6:10 (2012), pp. 575–88 (p. 576).
46ESRC, ‘What is Impact?’, available at: {https://esrc.ukri.org/research/impact-toolkit/what-is-impact/} accessed on 1
February 2019.
47Ibid.
48ESRC, Future of the Armed Forces: Understanding Issues around Integration of Regular and Reserve Personnel Call
Specification (Swindon: ESRC, 2013), pp. 3, 6.























































































































responsibilities to travel and engage in overnight stays to attend meetings, which may limit diver-
sity among contemporary ‘impact stars’.49 Such structural constraints may also exacerbate others.
For example, if institutions do not address the ‘exclusionary tendencies of impact work’ and
instead invest greater resource in ‘impact stars’, this could further entrench ‘inequalities of work-
load, bearing in mind the context of gendered workloads and time constraints already affecting
career progression’ within academia.50 Moreover, while social media can be a hostile environment
for any researcher seeking to disseminate ‘real world’ research, it has proved especially so for
women and ethnic minority scholars.51 Though arguably all scholars should want to develop a
better understanding of the policy or practice contexts of their research, the impact agenda elides
the unequal relationships between scholars and stakeholders who ‘gate keep’ access to their envir-
onments. Academics may find themselves demonstrating ‘deference to power’ in exchange for
access, often by engaging in functionalist research, which risks either ‘inadvertently or deliberately
sustaining dominant’ and, we would suggest, masculinist, ways of producing and applying knowl-
edge.52 In the more particular context of military and defence research, where functionalist and
positivist perspectives dominate, it is easy to see why our messy engagement with the everyday
experiences of women in relationships with reservists might trouble military stakeholders.
While some of the FRRP projects used more critical approaches than others, all of us hoped to
influence military policy through our findings. We adopted a critical military studies (CMS) per-
spective, an approach that emphasises that critical engagement with militaries and other security
institutions can be generative of deeper insights, especially when ‘underpinned by an understand-
ing of these institutions as accountable to the civilian world, and necessarily understood as poten-
tially open to collaboration and knowledge exchange’.53 For many CMS scholars, there is often a
clear ‘desire to engage with [military] people in interpersonal situations that comes with asking
critical questions about the military writ large’.54 Mindful of the militarising processes of func-
tionalism that can often occur when researching the military,55 we attempted to make sure
that we did not carry out ‘sanitized military-driven research’,56 while being open to the possibil-
ities for dialogue highlighted by CMS scholars. We prioritised the experiences of reservists and
their spouses/partners because as K. Neil Jenkings et al. highlight, while there is much research
on military recruitment and retention relating to general trends, policy reforms, and organisa-
tional practices, there is a dearth of fine-detailed accounts of individuals’ lived experiences of
joining and remaining in the military.57 We approached our project believing in the ‘need for
everyday mundane experiences of respondents to be heard’.58
49Michael Dougan and Charlotte O’Brien, ‘Reflections on law and impact in the light of Brexit’, The Law Teacher, 53:2
(2019), pp. 197–211.
50Dougan and O’Brien, ‘Reflections’, p. 208.
51Dougan and O’Brien, ‘Reflections’.
52Hayes, ‘The ESRC university project’, p. 13.
53Matthew Rech, Daniel Bos, K. Neil Jenkings, Alison Williams, and Rachel Woodward, ‘Geography,
military geography, and Critical Military Studies’, Critical Military Studies, 1:1 (2015), pp. 47–60 (p. 56). See also
Catherine Baker, Victoria Basham, Sarah Bulmer, Harriet Gray, and Alexandra Hyde, ‘Encounters with the military’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1 (2016), pp. 140–54; Victoria M. Basham, War, Identity and the Liberal
State: Everyday Experiences of the Geopolitical in the Armed Forces (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Victoria M. Basham,
Aaron Belkin, and Jess Gifkins, ‘What is Critical Military Studies?’, Critical Military Studies, 1:1 (2015), pp. 1–2.
54Baker et al., ‘Encounters’, p. 142.
55Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007),
p. 69; Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals’, Signs, 12:4 (1987), pp. 687–718.
56Higate and Cameron, ‘Reflexivity and researching’, p. 224.
57K. Neil Jenkings, Rachel Woodward R, Alison J. Williams, Matthew Rech, Ann L. Murphy, and Daniel Bos, ‘Military
occupations: Methodological approaches and the military-academy research nexus’, Sociology Compass, 5:1 (2011),
pp. 37–51 (p. 42).
58Brickell, ‘Geopolitics of home’, p. 577.























































































































All of the FRRP teams were aware that attracting public funding would involve clear plans for
stakeholder engagement, which was even more crucial because our projects and the programme
had been co-funded by the MoD and Army. Immediately following notification of our award
in April 2014, the ESRC held an initial meeting between the four research teams and our
MoD/Army stakeholders. Following this meeting, and notwithstanding the fact that all four pro-
jects had developed their own detailed pathways to impact plans, which had already been
reviewed by the ESRC’s Peer Review College, the ESRC issued a call for applications for further
funding for establishing a programme-wide ‘integrator’ team led by one of the four project teams.
The specific remit of the Integrator Team (IT) was to increase the potential impact of the research
programme, by coordinating and facilitating knowledge exchange activities and collaboration
across the programme and with all interested stakeholders.
The effect for us of establishing the IT was to engender unease about the potential conflict of
interest between one project team being given overall control of the impact agenda for the whole
FRRP. This increased when it became evident that the IT appeared keen to closely align the
FRRP’s impact objectives with military stakeholder aims without full discussion of its merits.
One critique of the impact agenda in relation to security projects is the risk that academics
can end up ‘offering, in effect, to work for the security services’ to get ahead in the knowledge
economy.59 Another is that many security practitioners and scholars marginalise women’s experi-
ences of insecurity and the benefits of better understanding them, instead universalising ‘male-
stream’ experiences, which our project sought to challenge.60 This kind of deference and
willingness to be useful to masculinised defence actors was evident in many of the interactions
between the IT, which was managed by a veteran turned academic, and the FRRP’s military sta-
keholders. This was particularly the case for the dissemination of results and engagement with the
media (discussed below), and the ESRC’s, FRRP’s, and our institution’s acquiescence to the
MoD’s ethics approval procedures to which we now turn.
How can we know? Disciplining feminist research on militaries
Traditional studies of war, strategy, and militaries are ‘characterised by hypothetico-deductive
epistemology and a resultant emphasis on positivist methodologies’.61 The preference for making
sense of military power in this way has led some to question the place of feminist research in IR.62
There has been considerable debate between feminist scholars, who approach the international
with an epistemological understanding that ‘the theorising that counts or matters, in terms of
affecting and/or creating international political events, is not confined either to policymakers
or to academics’,63 and more traditional scholars who regard such approaches ‘unscientific’.64
59Hayes, ‘The ESRC university project’, p. 13.
60Heidi Hudson, ‘“Doing” security as though humans matter: A feminist perspective on gender and the politics of human
security’, Security Dialogue, 36:2 (2005), pp. 155–74.
61Jenkings et al., ‘Military occupations’, p. 38.
62J. Ann Tickner, ‘You just don’t understand: Troubled engagements between feminists and IR theorists’, International
Studies Quarterly, 41:4 (1997), pp. 611–32.
63Marysia Zalewski, ‘“All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up”: Theories, theorists, theorising’, in Steve Smith, Ken
Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 340–53 (p. 346). See also Cynthia Enloe, ‘Margins, silences and bottom rungs: How to overcome the underesti-
mation of power in the study of International relations’, in Smith, Booth, and Zalewski (eds) International Theory, pp. 186–
202; Christine Sylvester, ‘The contributions of feminist theory to International Relations’, in Smith, Booth, and Zalewski
(eds), International Theory, pp. 254–78.
64Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Relations theory: Contributions of a feminist standpoint’, Millennium, 18:2 (1989),
pp. 245–53; Robert O. Keohane, ‘Beyond dichotomy: Conversations between International Relations and feminist theory’,
International Studies Quarterly, 42:1 (1998), pp. 193–7; Tickner, ‘You just don’t understand’; Tickner, ‘What is your research
program?’; Cynthia Weber, ‘Good girls, little girls, and bad girls: Male paranoia in Robert Keohane’s critique of feminist
International Relations’, Millennium, 23:2 (1994), pp. 337–49.























































































































Ironically, given the feminist emphasis on engaging with people’s lives and experiences, one line
of questioning that feminist IR scholars have been confronted with is what gender has to do with
‘real-world’ issues.65 Feminist IR has demonstrated repeatedly how profoundly gender matters to
the international.66 Yet the most authoritative voices in, and on, state security are still, for many,
those who occupy the elite masculinised world of statesmen, diplomats, and the highest-ranking
military officials where both men and masculinised cultures dominate.67
The positivist and masculinist emphasis on the ‘numerical representation of reality’ in the
study of war and militaries has been bolstered by the military’s own needs to quantitatively evalu-
ate personnel and their motivations.68 Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, the greatest challenge for
us in aiming to avoid conducting functionalist research while trying to gain access to participants
was created by members of the Army Scientific Advisory Committee (ASAC), comprised of psy-
chologists, who acted as the guardians of what they considered ‘proper’ scientific, that is, positiv-
ist, quantitative research, and the MoD’s Research Ethics Committee (MoDREC), comprised
almost entirely of medical and natural scientists plus some lay members either working in or
with the NHS.69 MoDREC was established in 2005 to assess and approve any research protocols
involving human participants within defence. Anyone in receipt of MoD funding must seek
MoDREC approval before initiating research on human subjects, though in practice, the broad
remit of the Joint Service Publication 536 (JSP 536), which establishes the MoD’s policy on
research usually means that individual services, sections, and units of the armed forces who
have been approached by non-MoD funded researchers for access defer to MoDREC. This is
because MoDREC stipulates that it provides guidance ‘for all involved in sponsoring, funding,
managing, reviewing and utilising research funded by MoD and/or involving MoD staff and/
or MoD entitled dependants that involves human participants’.70 This steering of researchers
without MoD or armed forces funding who want to engage with military personnel and their
‘entitled dependents’ towards MoDREC as a condition of access raises important questions
about the democratic accountability of the military given that the MoDREC process arguably
makes it harder for civilians, including researchers, to subject the military to oversight.
Until the early 2010s, social science research involving military personnel did not require
MoDREC approval. Ethics approval obtained by university/institutional boards was deemed suf-
ficient and researchers’ access to potential military research participants was informally granted
by mid-to-high ranking officers (lieutenant colonel and above) through ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ments’.71 ‘Sponsoring’ senior officers would provide access to researchers on the understanding
that they would conduct research that could be useful to them/the military and that such research
65Tickner, ‘You just don’t understand’; Marysia Zalewski, ‘Well, what is the feminist perspective on Bosnia?’, International
Affairs, 71:2 (1995), pp. 339–56.
66Catherine Eschle, ‘Gender and the subject of (anti-)nuclear politics: Revisiting women’s campaigning against the bomb’,
International Studies Quarterly, 57:4 (2013), pp. 713–24; Lene Hansen, ‘Gender, nation, rape: Bosnia and the construction of
security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3:1 (2000), pp. 55–75; Maria O’Reilly, ‘Muscular interventionism’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 14:4 (2012), pp. 529–48.
67Basham, War, Identity and the Liberal State; Eric M. Blanchard, ‘Gender, International Relations, and the development
of Feminist Security theory’, Signs, 28:4 (2003), pp. 1289–312; Ann Towns and Birgitta Niklasson, ‘Gender, international sta-
tus, and ambassador appointments’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13:3 (2017), pp. 521–40; Catignani and Basham, ‘Reproducing
the military and heteropatriarchal normal’.
68Rech, ‘An introduction’, p. 6.
69For a list of current MoDREC members, see MoDREC, available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ministry-
of-defence-research-ethics-committees#ethics-committee-members} accessed 4 April 2019.
70MoD, JSP 536 Ministry of Defence Policy for Research Involving Human Participants Part 1: Directive (London: MoD,
2014), p. 1.
71‘Gentlemen’s agreements’ are common in militaries because they are masculinised, self-governing institutions as a result
of the axiomatic significance afforded to security actors. See Joni Seager, Earth Follies: Feminism, Politics and the Environment
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2019).























































































































would not cause any reputational damage to them or the wider military.72 However, in early 2014,
Territorial Army Captain Mike Martin, who had been commissioned and funded by the MoD to
pursue a PhD examining the British military campaign in Helmand, was banned by the MoD
from publishing his thesis because his critique of the intelligence mishaps and failures of
commanders on the ground proved embarrassing to several MoD officials. Due to this very public
fallout between Martin, his publisher, and the MoD, Martin resigned from the Army in order to
get his uncensored PhD published.73 Then Defence Minister, Phillip Hammond, already accused
of being paranoid about his handling of any criticism involving the MoD,74 set out to limit
researchers’ access to defence.75 This, we argue, has circumscribed what research is conducted,
and how – and thus, whose voices are heard – by mandating that projects undergo MoDREC
in order to avoid research causing further reputational damage to the MoD.
JSP 536 ensures that functionalism is built into research involving military personnel from the
outset by stipulating that the MoD ‘does not undertake research involving human participants
unless it is for the benefit of MoD or other Government Departments’.76 On submission of a
research protocol – a form comprised of some twenty sections, numerous subsections, and up
to 11 supporting documents – applications are first sent to the relevant service committee, in
our case the ASAC ‘for scientific review’.77 Our relationship with most of ASAC’s members
was fraught from the start because of their assumptions about the validity of our interpretive
methodology and about the utility of our critically informed approach. ASAC members conduct
‘in-house’ research on the Army’s behalf when not assisting the MoDREC process. Suspicion
towards our methodology and the utility of our project was likely heightened by the fact that
such in-house teams ‘have potentially much to lose from research that is conducted by academic
investigators’.78 That is, external academics can be perceived as competitors or as disruptive if
challenging long-held assumptions of what good social science is.
While ASAC’s official role in the MoDREC process is to guarantee that studies do not ‘present
an unacceptable risk to either the participants or the researchers’ from a research ethics
standpoint, protocols are assessed also ‘for technical and scientific rigour, i.e. to ensure that
the methods proposed in the application are well-designed and sufficiently robust to provide
the information required’.79 Although the process was purportedly focused on research ethics,
ASAC principally concentrated on ensuring that our project was ‘scientifically and methodologic-
ally robust’.80 Despite being told that we had a ‘clear rationale’ and that the ‘overarching project
aims [were] clearly specified’, ASAC reviewers insisted that we ‘more fully explain what potential
value there might [be] to the MoD in terms of application/utility of the research findings’.81
Despite the fact that we could not predict our research findings, and thus their utility to the
MoD, due to adopting a grounded theory approach, and given the fact that ASAC had already
mandated changes to our research participant recruitment strategies that were not envisaged in
72Both authors had been granted such informal sponsorship and access to conduct research on the British Army during
the period in which JSP 536 was already in force, but not systematically enforced against social scientists.
73Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict (London: Hurst, 2014).
74Ian Drury, ‘Fury over MoD bid to ban soldier’s book about Afghanistan: Officials embarrassed by study they asked for’,
Daily Mail (10 April 2014), available at: {https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2600411/amp/Ministry-Defence-tries-
block-book-Helmand-commissioned-claims-contains-secrets-published-Wikileaks.html} accessed 4 June 2019.
75Telephone conversation with retired British Army colonel, 8 August 2014.
76MoD, JSP 536, p. 4
77Ibid., p. 9.
78Eyal Ben-Ari and Yagil Levy, ‘Getting access to the field’, in Joseph Soeters, Patricia M. Shields, and Sebastian Rietjens
(eds), Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 9–18 (p. 13).
79ASAC reviewers’ comments, 2 September 2014.
80Authors’ telephone conversations and email correspondence with ASAC members during the ethics approval process,
June to September 2014.
81ASAC reviewers’ comments, 2 September 2014.























































































































our original research proposal, we were nonetheless forced to speculate, again, on the utility of our
future research findings as already outlined and assessed in our pathways to impact plan.
Furthermore, although we had not made generalisability claims in our research proposal or
ethics application – given that our project was based on an interpretive, inductive, and grounded
theory approach – ASAC insisted that we ‘emphasise the limitations of findings derived through
the proposed methodology, particularly with regards to generalisability’.82 Within military insti-
tutions, masculinist common sense knowledge dictates that generalisable data is preferable;83
being asked to emphasise the limitations of our feminist approach was gendered.84 Moreover,
this stipulation from ASAC made it easier for those within the MoD, who later did not like
our findings, to more easily dismiss them as anecdotal and of no use to the MoD.
Throughout the ethics approval process and during our mid-term and final project presenta-
tions to stakeholders, it was difficult to convince ASAC members and MoD stakeholders of the
benefits of our interpretivist approach and, thus that experiential data could be of value to the
MoD. As emphasised by others who have researched the military, ‘those working within military
institutions and forces … have a more traditional view of what constitutes “reliable” social scien-
tific research’.85 For example, at a mid-project stakeholder event held by the four FRRP project
teams in June 2017 to share our interim findings, we went to great lengths to explain that our
data was rigorously obtained and analysed in accordance with established qualitative social sci-
ence methods and that it was therefore indicative of clear trends across interviews. Regardless,
a disheartening number of military personnel and stakeholders dismissed our findings as ‘anec-
dotes’ and our methodology as inadequate. The vehement criticism levelled at the methodological
underpinnings of FRRP projects in front of a large stakeholder audience led to the research teams
and FRRP stakeholders having to agree at a subsequent Programme Board (PB) meeting on
minimal standards of civilised behaviour that future stakeholder workshop/conference attendees
would have to adhere to. A primer explaining the utility of qualitative research was also drawn up
as a result of the blowback the projects experienced in stakeholder workshops and PB meetings.86
Other objections from ASAC during the MoDREC process seemed to be based on political
concerns. The complex reality of recruiting research participants and, even more so, getting to
interview them again, requires flexible sampling strategies. We consequently built flexible time-
lines into our project because our purposive sampling method involved recruiting reservists
with very busy lifestyles and spouses/partners who likely had caring responsibilities, were in
some form of employment, and possibly were also involved in volunteer work and/or a hobby.
Yet, ASAC insisted that sampling timelines should be ‘unambiguously specified’. ASAC justified
this on the basis that it was ‘a key component of a triangulated approach’ but admitted that their
request was ‘especially important as this subject is highly politicised and therefore subject to
much media scrutiny’.87 Indeed, following many years of underfunding and neglect, the Army
Reserve was set to receive significant investment (£1.8 billion) and to increase its personnel num-
bers at a time in which,88 as a result of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review process,
Regular forces and capabilities were undergoing major cutbacks, including 30,000 personnel cuts
in the Regular Army alone. As Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani show, this sizeable investment
of the Reserves, notwithstanding the planned Regular armed forces cuts, was the result of lobby-
ing efforts by both serving and former Reserve personnel who were members of Parliament, some
82Ibid.
83Basham, War, Identity and the Liberal State.
84Ramazanoglu and Holland, Feminist Methodology.
85Jenkings et al., ‘Military occupations’, p. 45.
86FRRP, Understanding the Social World through Qualitative Research (2018), available at: {http://www.future-reserves-
research.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FRRP-information-sheet-qualitative-research-and-numbers-of-research-partici-
pants.pdf} accessed 1 July 2019.
87ASAC reviewers’ comments, 2 September 2014.
88MoD, Reserves in the Future Force 2020.























































































































of whom were also sitting on the Defence Select Committee. Such members recommended the
expansion of the Reserves in order to obviate the cuts of the Regular armed forces. Even so,
many other Conservative backbenchers resented the planned Regular Army personnel cuts.89
Born out of political controversy and in contrast to the wishes of the Army’s leadership,90
which consisted almost entirely of Regular officers, the Coalition government were concerned
that the Army would not fully comply with the FR2020 reforms and that deviation from its
implementation would galvanise opposition from both proponents and opponents of the
proposed organisational reforms. Thus, ‘[f]rom the outset of the FR20 programme, the size
and capability of the Reserves … attracted intense political and media interest.’91 Many believed
that the feasibility of FR2020 programmes hinged on achieving ambitious recruitment and reten-
tion objectives. Reports from organisations such as the National Audit Office,92 Select Defence
Committee,93 Reserve Forces and Cadets Association’s Annual External Scrutiny Team,94 as
well as Parliamentary debates,95 and media coverage obsessively focused on whether or not the
Army would achieve its recruitment and retention targets.96 During the period of research asso-
ciated with the FRRP such scrutiny was at its height given that such targets were regularly being
missed and reported publicly, much to the Army and MoD’s embarrassment.97 Thus, projects like
ours, which examined factors affecting recruitment and retention shortcomings had the potential
to highlight the Army’s recruitment and retention failures, and thus, add further stress on the
Army’s and MoD’s public image concerns. As we show below, the MoD accordingly ensured
that social and regular media engagement with the FRRP was severely limited, if not stifled,
by the ‘Communications and Engagement Plan’ that all projects had to abide by during the
programme’s duration.
Who can we know about? Marginalising women’s voices in military research
The central concern of research ethics frameworks is avoiding the coercion of potential research
participants and, thus, ensuring that participation in research is voluntary.98 However, the fact
that ethics committees require that research relationships must be ‘formalized through written
89Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani, ‘Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during
the Cameron era’, International Affairs, 95:3 (2019), pp. 681–701.
90‘Reservists are no replacement for regular troops, head of army says’, Daily Telegraph (28 October 2014).
91Robin Brims, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2016 (London: Council of
Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Association, 2016), p. 8.
92National Audit Office, Army 2020 HC 263 (London: NAO, 14 June 2014); National Audit Office, Investigation into the
British Army Recruiting Partnering Project HC 1781.
93See, for example, Defence Committee, Future Army 2020: Ninth Report of Session 2013-14 HC 576 (London: House of
Commons, 29 January 2014), pp. 33–41; Defence Committee, Re-Thinking Defence to Meet New Threats HC 512 (London:
House of Commons, 24 March 2015), pp. 44–5.
94For 2017–19 Reserve Forces and Cadets Association’s Annual External Scrutiny Team Reports, see: {https://glrfca.org/
publications/index}.
95House of Commons, ‘Army Reserve’, Hansard 588 (24 November 2014); House of Commons, ‘Army Reserve’, Hansard
590 (12 January 2015); House of Commons, ‘Defence’, Hansard 634 (11 January 2018).
96BBC News, ‘Armed forces plans criticised as reservist recruitment stalls’, BBC Online (13 November 2014), available at:
{https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30033506} last accessed 16 November 2020; Adam Lusher, ‘Revealed: How the government’s
big austerity plan to replace regular soldiers with reservists has “led to crisis”’, The Independent (24 July 2017), available at:
{https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/austerity-british-army-recruitment-crisis-philip-hammond-cuts-
capita-outsourcing-not-enough-trained-soldiers-low-numbers-morale-poor-pay-conditions-understrength-armed-forces-
accommodation-security-strategic-a7825626.html} accessed 16 November 2020; Frances Perraudin, ‘UK frontline troop num-
bers down by as much as a third’, Guardian Online (1 April 2019), available at: {https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/
apr/01/numbers-in-uk-frontline-army-units-fall-by-up-to-a-third-figures-reveal} accessed 16 November 2020.
97Bury and Catignani, ‘Future Reserves 2020’.
98Tina Miller and Mary Boulton, ‘Changing constructions of informed consent: Qualitative research and complex social
worlds’, Social Science and Medicine, 65 (2007), pp. 2199–211.























































































































consent at the outset … has implications for those trying to research hidden groups or those who
are difficult to access’.99 Moreover, efforts to ‘standardise procedures and regulate ethical practice’
can act as mechanisms to ‘contain what are often, in reality, complex social worlds and research
encounters that do not fit neatly into boxes which can be ticked’.100 Such standardisation
and regulation is particularly challenging for research, such as ours, which attempts to focus
its ‘attention to the micropolitics of military power’.101
We had set out to examine ‘the intricate [and thus] … complex and often contradictory power
of gender in terms of the various roles, identities and scripts’,102 which spouses/partners of mili-
tary personnel take on or are subject to and which have been shown to affect the everyday lives of
those involved in war-making or war preparations.103 Both ASAC and MoDREC made this
difficult when they deemed snowballing, a commonly used and legitimate sampling strategy
that is particularly effective for accessing ‘hard to reach’ populations,104 a ‘poor’ methodological
approach. ASAC and MoDREC forced us to create an intricate recruitment process whereby
spouses/partners would learn about our research project only if the reservist interviewed was will-
ing to share our information and recruitment leaflet with his spouse/partner. That is, we could
only recruit spouses/partners through reservists acting as gatekeepers. Such restrictions in the
name of ‘ethics’ impeded our ability to give voice to the concerns of reservists’ partners/spouses,
highlighting how the politics of knowledge production often influences and underpins ethical
quandaries.105
Accessing prospective research participants presupposes that individuals can decide whether
or not to consent to participate. Yet most qualitative research depends on gatekeepers: those
who are in a position to permit access to others. While the nature of the research relationship
between researcher and researched is crucial, we believe that particularly within the context of
researching military institutions, the research process and types of information that are ultimately
produced are produced through the relationship that develops between the researcher(s) and
gatekeeper(s). As Paul Higate and Ailsa Cameron, and Amanda Chisholm, have argued, access
in military-related research is often influenced by military culture, which tends to engender
the social construction of ‘insider and outsider categories between military personnel and civi-
lians’.106 They argue that this ‘“them” and “us” dichotomy may impact on the practical problem
of access’ to the military and the interactions that civilian researchers can have with their military
research participants.107 The outsider researcher can come to be seen as a comparatively ‘uncon-
trolled element in an otherwise highly structured environment’.108 Thus, gatekeepers often evalu-
ate the potential for any negative consequences as a result of the research before granting access to
those they have gatekeeping power over.
99Tina Miller and Linda Bell, ‘Consenting to what?’ Issues of access, gate-keeping and “informed” consent’, in Tina Miller,
Maxine Birch, and Melanie Mauthner (eds), Ethics in Qualitative Research (London: SAGE, 2012), pp. 61–75.
100Miller and Boulton, ‘Changing constructions’, p. 2202.
101Alexandra Hyde, ‘The civilian wives of military personnel: Mobile subjects or agents of militarisation?’, in Rachel
Woodward and Claire Duncanson (eds), The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military (London:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 195–209 (p. 195).
102Hyde, ‘The civilian wives’, p. 195.
103Basham and Catignani, ‘War is where the hearth is’.
104Rowland Atkinson and John Flint, Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies:
Social Research Update No. 33 (Guildford: University of Surrey, 2001).
105Kevin D. Haggerty, ‘Ethics creep: Governing social science research in the name of ethics’, Qualitative Sociology, 27:4
(2004), pp. 391–414.
106Higate and Cameron, ‘Reflexivity and researching’, p. 224. Amanda Chisholm, ‘Ethnography in conflict zones: The
perils of researching private contractors’, in Williams, Jenkings, Woodward, and Rech (eds), The Routledge Companion to
Military Research Methods (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 138–52.
107Higate and Cameron, ‘Reflexivity and researching’, p. 224.
108Tom Clark, ‘Gaining and maintaining access: Exploring the mechanisms that support and challenge the relationship
between gatekeepers and researchers’, Qualitative Social Work, 10:4 (2010), pp. 485–502 (p. 488).























































































































Eyal Ben-Ari and Yagil Levy suggest that insider/outsider categories are determined ‘upon
entry and during the first stage of research’ on the basis of how closely the researcher is asso-
ciated/aligned with the military at the outset of the project.109 Whether an academic is deemed
an insider or outsider is particularly crucial when considering which academics are invited to
provide advice or conduct other impact activities by policymakers. As eminent defence academic
Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman admits, those selected as defence ‘insiders’, are those who will
most likely ‘share assumptions and are likely to reinforce conclusions’ with policymakers, thus
turning what should be a ‘challenging interaction into an echo chamber’ and creating a ‘regular
clique of scholars consulted’.110 Our own experiences of engaging with such ‘defence intellectuals’
are that these circles are notoriously dominated by ideas and bodies that are male, pale, and, we
would argue, increasingly stale. As feminist IR scholars have shown, it matters who gets to be in
the ‘circle’ because ‘gender discourse informs and shapes’ security discourse and ‘in so doing
creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored
if they manage to get in.’111
While JSP 536 aims to ensure that ethical standards are met, it neglects ‘the potentially
complex power dynamics that can operate around access and consent especially where issues
of gender’ are conspicuous.112 As Sue Jervis has shown, ‘considerable anxiety arises in military
communities when ordinarily concealed emotions are revealed’, which ‘inevitably influences
negotiations between the military and researchers engaged in exploring service families’ under-
lying feelings⍰⍰.113 Rather than being motivated purely by research ethics, we contend that
the MoDREC process was a means through which research on the complex lived experiences
and emotions of reservists and members of their family could be kept hidden. Such barriers
are perhaps unsurprising ‘given that the military institution itself discourages any engagement
with potentially messy and unruly feelings’.114 Our interviews highlighted discrepancies between
the accounts of reservists and their spouses/partners over who and what enables reservists to fulfil
their reserve service obligations, so they had the potential to cause friction. Nonetheless, while we
were cognisant of the possibly delicate nature of research involving household relationships, we
were also aware that British Army reservists’ partners/spouses (and by extension their families)
are considered ‘hard-to-reach’ populations, making it important to try to reach them.115
Indeed, during the ethics approval process ASAC members admitted that prior attempts by
Army internal research teams to recruit reservist spouses/partners as research participants had
all failed.116 Ironically, ASAC members could not fathom that reservists’ spouses/partners are
hard to reach precisely because of the complex recruitment and gatekeeping procedures that
the ASAC/MoDREC process requires.
Military stakeholders set up methodological recruitment barriers that frustrated our attempts to
explore dynamics we originally proposed and that the Army and MoD co-funded. In allowing
reservists, the majority of whom are men, to act as gatekeepers, MoDREC gave them substantial
power and choice over whether to allow or deny access to their spouses/partners, the majority
of whom are women in heterosexual relationships. We recognised that our ability to access
109Ben-Ari and Levy, ‘Getting access’, pp. 14–15.
110Lawrence Freedman, ‘Academics and policy-making: Rules of engagement’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:1–2 (2017),
pp. 263–8 (p. 3); Blagden, ‘Politics, policy and the UK impact agenda’, p. 99.
111Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick, ‘The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction’,
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Paper No. 38 (Stockholm, 2005), p. 5. See also Jane L. Parpart and Swati
Parashar (eds), Rethinking Silence, Voice and Agency in Contested Gendered Terrains (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019).
112Miller and Bell, ‘Consenting to what?’, p. 63.
113Sue Jervis, ‘Psychoanalytically informed reflexive research with service spouses’, in Williams, Jenkings, Woodward, and
Rech (eds), The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods, pp. 167–79 (p. 175).
114Jervis, ‘Psychoanalytically informed reflexive research’, p. 167.
115Anna Sydor, ‘Conducting research into hidden or hard-to-reach populations’, Nurse Researcher, 20:3 (2013), pp. 33–7.
116Telephone conversations with ASAC members, summer 2014.























































































































women’s voices was contingent on reaching those reservists who less jealously guarded their
personal time and space from the scrutiny of not only civilian ‘outsiders’ such as us, but also
from their spouses/partners. By impeding access to their spouses/partners, reservists could avoid
raising uncomfortable discussions regarding the gendered and unequal division of household
labour and the negative impact that their time away has on household members.117
The difficulty in accessing and recruiting spouses/partners led one of the project’s stakeholders,
the Army Directorate Personnel Capability, which administers and analyses responses from Army
reservists to the RESCAS, to agree to inserting recruitment leaflets in each of the 12,428 question-
naires sent out to Army Reserve units during 2015 to assist us and two other projects researching
reservist family issues. While the response rate for the 2015 RESCAS was 28 per cent (3,495
responses),118 only 11 spouses/partners replied to the recruitment leaflet, giving a dismal response
rate of 0.09 per cent. Once it became apparent during fieldwork that the recruitment strategies for
spouse/partners approved by ASAC and MoDREC were not working, we considered breaching the
protocol and resorting to snowball recruiting. We considered this to be justified because: (a) some
of our project research aims and methods (including snowballing), and pathways to impact plans
that had been approved during the ESRC peer review process could not be achieved by abiding by
the MoDREC protocol; and (b) because the prohibiting of snowball sampling had been rationalised
by ASAC and MoDREC on methodological rather than ethical grounds. Yet, because of the
disciplining nature of the MoDREC process and the requirements for periodically reporting on
our research activities to the FRRP PB – which included representatives from ASAC – we feared
potential sanctions had we used snowballing and been discovered by members of the PB or by
MoDREC itself. We therefore complied with restrictive participant recruitment measures and
fell in line with the knowledge economy ethos to pander to stakeholder sensitivities.119
What can we know and say? National security and research
Our research was also affected by assumptions about how it fitted with ‘a broader “national inter-
est” dictum’ held by military gatekeepers.120 As Ben-Ari argues, the ‘specific characteristics of the
military as a large-scale, hierarchical, masculinised, and secretive organization’ influences what
knowledge is produced about it.121 Indeed, gatekeepers hold concerns over ‘representation …
unwanted intrusions … concerns for the privacy of those engaged … and even harm to the gate-
keeper or those associated with it’ that engagement can bring.122 We argue that such concerns
made our military gatekeepers more concerned about the public representation of their organisa-
tion than about civic and moral responsibilities to engage. Given the methodological hostility
towards our qualitative, interpretive, feminist-inspired research and how this shaped who we
were able to interview, our research objectives to identify good practice and areas for change
in military policy were only partially reached. When it came to accessing reservists’ partners/
spouses, a population overwhelmingly comprising women, gatekeepers limited our ability to
engage and learn about these women’s experiences. The spouse/partner interviews that we did
manage to conduct highlighted the significant contributions they make to the UK’s security cap-
abilities through their support for reservists, but it left some questions we had about this ‘hidden
population’ unanswered and left us frustrated about the ethics of marginalising these women,
supposedly for their own protection.
117Basham and Catignani, ‘War is where the hearth is’; Edna Lomsky-Feder, Nir Gazit, and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Reserve soldiers
as transmigrants moving between the civilian and military worlds’, Armed Forces & Society, 34:4 (2008), pp. 593–614.
118MoD, Tri-Service Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey 2015 (London: MoD, 2015), p. 34.
119Hayes, ‘The ESRC university project’.
120Jenkings et al., ‘Military occupations’, p. 44.
121Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Reflexivity: Potentially “dangerous liaisons”’, in Soeters, Shields, and Rietjens (eds), Handbook of
Research Methods in Military Studies, pp. 29–39 (p. 32).
122Clark, ‘Gaining and maintaining access’, p. 488.























































































































These limits on what we could know were accompanied by limits on what we could say. Some
months into the project, our military stakeholders suddenly communicated that in future, all
communications material, whether in print or online, would require formal approval by the
Army Media Team or Defence Communications Directorate before it could be circulated pub-
licly. Ben-Ari has observed that any facilitation of access to material or personnel by militaries
may come at the expense of constraints on publication and censorship.123 Yet, as researchers
co-funded by the ESRC, a body committed to independent research, this came as a shock.
This stipulation was issued despite our project already having been approved by the ESRC’s rigor-
ous peer review process and by the MoD’s highly bureaucratic and lengthy ethics approval
process,124 which had already limited what and who could be researched, and more crucially,
how our research could be conducted methodologically.
Following initial work between the MoD and the IT, the first draft of the ‘Communications
and Engagement Plan’ was matter-of-factly distributed by email to all project teams outlining
the ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ [sic] that we would have to follow in order to disseminate
any project and programme research findings. The plan was all encompassing; all dissemination
events and communications were to be subject to ‘confidentialities by the MoD’, thus, raising
concerns that the plan would produce unsuitable expectations of MoD control over research find-
ings.125 Despite tense negotiations conducted over two years between MoD/Army stakeholders
and FRRP academics,126 and despite the project teams’ continued resistance to such constraints,
the plan continued to contain highly restrictive dissemination provisions. By late 2015 these were
justified by the MoD as necessary in order ‘to avoid any unintended breaches of security’.127
Notwithstanding the challenges of sharing information even within the military, let alone with
people external to the military, due to the over-classification of most of its documentation,128
the fact that none of the research projects had been given any security clearance made it highly
unlikely that we would be privy to security-sensitive information that could be breached.
Moreover, such ‘security’ concerns seemed preposterous given the fact that our project was
mainly focused on ostensibly civilian individuals who spend their ‘spare’ time engaging in
military activities or supporting their spouse/partners to do so.
Two years into the three-year research programme, reaching some form of compromise on
dissemination and media engagement became necessary due to several project teams being
close to submitting articles to academic journals. Communication guidelines for this were grudg-
ingly agreed upon by all parties in June 2016. Reaching the agreement on the ‘Funders’
Communications and Engagement Guidelines’ was more a result of attrition than genuine collab-
oration. We simply could not continue negotiating guidelines into the third and final year of the
programme because of the MoD’s continued intransigence. Due to the fact that our stakeholders
were not only co-funders, but also our sponsors – the principal gatekeepers who could grant us
continued access to research participants – the balance of power ultimately remained with them.
While the guidelines acknowledged the serious concerns regarding academic freedom that we had
raised during negotiations, we would nonetheless be required to inform the MoD ‘of all planned
releases of publications and/or contact with the media’.129
123Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Anthropological research and state violence: Some observations of an Israeli anthropologist’, in Laura
McNamara and Robert A. Rubinstein (eds), Dangerous Liaisons: Anthropologists and the National Security State (Sante
Fe, NM: School of Advanced Research Press, 2011), pp. 167–84.
124MoDREC was such a lengthy process that all four project teams had to apply for a one-year no-cost extension.
125Standard Operating Procedures: Communications and Engagement Plan, February 2015 draft.
126Email communications and PB discussions, June 2014 to March 2016.
127Communications and Engagement Plan, September 2015 draft.
128Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with knowledge: Organizational learning in the British Army?’, Journal of Strategic Studies,
37:1 (2014), pp. 30–64.
129Communications and Engagement Plan, September 2015 draft.























































































































The MoD insisted that all outputs would have to be reviewed in advance of dissemination for
three key reasons. First, ‘to check that any material released posed no risk to national security’.130
Given that any issue, no matter how mundane, can be securitised and, thus, become ultimately
subject to censorship in the name of security,131 we felt intellectually constrained by, but power-
less to challenge, this. This was compounded by the second requirement, which necessitated that
the MoD ‘check for factual accuracy’ in order to ‘reduce the need for any formal response of cor-
rection following the publication or release of material’.132 Although the guidelines specified that
this would mostly pertain to ‘numbers and dates’, the IT and eventually the project teams capi-
tulated to MoD sensitivities by granting ‘that “facts” can become a grey area’ and that ‘in the spirit
of collaboration, the MoD may offer comment about what may be perceived as deduction or
interpretation’.133 This allowed for possible MoD challenges to researchers’ deductions or inter-
pretations making the guidelines’ reiteration of the need to not compromise ‘academic freedom
or rigorous research practices’ sound rather perfunctory.134
The third requirement was to provide the MoD with ‘adequate notice of the release of findings
from the programme to allow them to prepare an appropriate response if required’.135 Again, a
major area of contention during negotiations related to what would be considered ‘adequate
notice’ in light of the fact that the MoD was asking for long timelines to comb through research
outputs. Ultimately, the research teams begrudgingly accepted both processes, and also the
specific timescales for review and approval set out by the MoD and agreed by the ESRC.
These were 28 days for the review and approval of any substantive publications (that is, research
articles and monographs), 14 days for any other papers, and 72 hours’ notice for blog postings
and press releases. In September 2016, the MoD also obliged project teams to provide ‘a copy
of the abstract and details of the conference or event’ researchers were expecting to present
research findings at within 72 hours of the proposal being accepted.136 Any engagement with
the media would require prior media training and 72 hours’ notice in order to receive ‘clearance
of communications’ from the FRRP MoD Liaison Officer and the ESRC Lead/Press office. This
effectively obliterated possibilities for media engagement, which require much quicker response
times given the rapid media/information cycle. Both Twitter and blog media platforms could
only be employed by the IT to disseminate information containing ‘previously approved content’
by the MoD.137
While the above processes and timescales were portrayed as requirements instigated by both
the ESRC and the MoD, the obsession with security sensitivities and the level of scrutiny insti-
tuted far superseded the ESRC’s standard reporting requirements and media sensitivities. The
ESRC only requires that researchers briefly summarise research outcomes, outputs, and
impact-related activities annually through a simple online reporting platform called research-
fish.138 Furthermore, the ESRC does not require researchers to seek feedback, corrections, or
approval for publication/dissemination. Crucially, it does not expect researchers to notify or
seek its approval to communicate with, or publish in, the media; in fact the ESRC keenly
encourages engagement with the media and even provides guidance and practical support,
including media training. Media engagement is encouraged because ‘when academics seek to
130Ibid.
131Joseph Masco, ‘“Sensitive but unclassified”: Secrecy and the counterterrorist state’, Public Culture, 22:3 (2010), pp. 433–
63; Owen D. Thomas, ‘Security in the balance: How Britain tried to keep its Iraq War secrets’, Security Dialogue, 51:1 (2019),
pp. 77–95.




136Funders’ Guidelines for Communications and Engagement, 29 June 2016.
137Ibid.
138See: {https://www.researchfish.net/}.























































































































demonstrate their impact, they are most likely to point to blogs, tweets and TV commentary’.139 It
is often through such mediums that research is ‘picked up by the media and become[s] the
subject of regular debate’.140
Notwithstanding these differences in public dissemination requirements and the research
teams’ protestations, the ESRC deferred to the MoD on these matters. The ESRC also acquiesced
to the MoD’s demand – which came after they heard our interim findings – that all FRRP
researchers undergo bespoke mandatory media training provided by an external consultancy.
Despite being reassured that this training would be a ‘safe space’ to test out communicating
our findings to wider audiences, MoD personnel attended and offered commentary throughout,
some of which directly contested the mock presentation of our research findings. The ESRC’s
senior press manager told us that the training would be ‘bespoke’ because as ‘part of the scheme
you will be placed in a high-profile position when it comes to being spokespeople for any
potentially contentious issues and policy areas affected by your topics’.141 As a publicly funded
organisation, the ESRC thus used additional taxpayer money to ensure we would communicate
potentially politically contentious material ‘appropriately’; that is, according to the sensitivities
of the MoD.
These communication control measures ultimately fulfilled the MoD’s desire to mitigate any
reputational damage by deliberately limiting public knowledge of the FRRP and its findings.
While the number of followers, tweets/retweets, and likes are not an exact indicator of a
Twitter account’s popularity and impact, the small number of followers (263) and the trifling
number of tweets, retweets, and replies (303) mostly of other Twitter accounts and content
not produced by the FRRP or any of its members, attests to the irrisory online/social media pres-
ence of the FRRP between 2014 and 2018.142 Moreover, despite the compulsory media training
and the stringent ‘standard operating procedures’ for engaging the media that FRRP researchers
were required to undergo and abide by, MoD stakeholders were able to censure any media cover-
age of FRRP activities and outputs throughout the programme’s lifetime. As part of its wider
impact agenda, the ESRC sees increasing the likelihood that publicly funded research reaches a
wider audience and has a greater chance of ‘influenc[ing] policy and public opinion’ as essential
and encourages researchers to have a ‘clear media strategy’.143 However, the bureaucratic and
militarised approval process that the FRRP teams were subjected to reveals the extent to which
the ESRC – given that it was closely involved in all correspondence and had attended all PB meet-
ings with our MoD stakeholders – caved into the MoD’s stifling media and communications
‘standard operating procedures’.144 Indeed, the ESRC co-signed and, thus, approved the guide-
lines. Although the ESRC itself did not seek such reporting and approval requirements from
the research teams, it nevertheless left us at the mercy of the MoD’s scrutiny and its micro-
management of our public engagement and dissemination activities during the programme’s
duration.
The MoD’s fastidious intrusion throughout the project can be explained by the fact that ultim-
ately militaries are ‘bureaucratized, centralized, secretive, masculinized … and preoccupied by
[their] public imagery’.145 From their standpoint, the ultimate danger posed by ‘external’
researchers is the possible exposure of ‘information to the outside where the military organisation
has much less control’.146 Our stakeholders’ concerns regarding our potential research findings
were palpable even during initial PB meetings where some stakeholders admitted from the outset
139Freedman, ‘Academics and policy-making’, p. 4.
140Ibid., p. 5.
141Email correspondence with ESRC senior press manager, 11 May 2016.
142See: {https://twitter.com/FutureReserves}.
143ESRC, Working with the Media: A Best Practice Guide (Swindon: ESRC, n.d.), p. 28.
144Funders’ Guidelines for Communications and Engagement, 29 June 2016.
145Ben-Ari and Levy, ‘Getting access’, p. 12.
146Ibid.























































































































that the FRRP was too politically sensitive and that our findings would raise undue media and
political scrutiny.
The peak of such concerns manifested when, following the review of our end of project and
programme draft reports, our MoD stakeholders admitted that ‘there remain[ed] some strong
concern that there [would] be a negative backlash rather than constructive debate’ at the end
of the programme stakeholder conference that was scheduled to run on Reserve Forces Day
2018. Our MoD stakeholders accordingly asked us to revise our reports by ‘consider[ing] how
best to avoid easy wins for the press’.147 The project teams though did not write such reports
to gain press notoriety, but to candidly report three years’ worth of research findings. In light
of the fact that the project teams were unwilling to tergiversate their findings due to MoD public
image sensitivities, our MoD stakeholders informed us, just weeks prior to the end of programme
stakeholder conference that it would have to be cancelled and rescheduled at a later date.
This event had been planned for almost a year. Exasperated by the MoD’s behaviour, the four
project teams threatened to walk out of any future MoD-endorsed events. The threat worked and
the event went ahead as scheduled. However, the MoD insisted that no social media messages
could be posted during the event and that no media representatives could attend given the pro-
gramme’s decision to not attenuate project and programme presentations. The conference had no
dissemination or impact effects. Without any significantly senior Regular or Reserve commanders
– including the actual MoD sponsor of the FRRP, the Head of the Army Reserves – present, the
event that was supposed to represent the culmination of a major research collaboration between
the military and civilian researchers, became little more than a footnote.
The MoD’s growing disinterest, and ultimately the imminent conclusion of the FRRP, led our
MoD stakeholders to concede that, with the official closure of the programme on 31 October
2018, they would no longer have personnel available to liaise with the FRRP and review future
publications, and thus would no longer require the review and approval of our publications,
including this one.
Conclusion: A cautionary tale and invitation
In this article we have examined the key challenges we faced as scholars trying to contribute to
better policy and practice through a feminist, qualitative approach that prioritised the experiences
and voices of those we researched. Cognisant of the pitfalls of contributing to the knowledge
economy, which prioritises utilisable research, but mindful of the advantages of engaged critique
outlined by CMS scholars, we sought to challenge the functionalist and masculinised assumptions
of MoD policymakers and widen their understanding of ‘meaningful research’. However, the
pervasiveness of functionalism, the politics of military policymaking, the weight of military
bureaucracy, the passivity of the ESRC, and the power asymmetry between the four project
teams and the MoD, ultimately frustrated how we could conduct our research, who we could
access and hear, and what we could know and say.
This matters because the lives of reservists and their partners/spouses were our primary focus and
little was known before our project about their lives began. Unfortunately, the challenges that we have
detailed above meant that our project too was limited in its ability to give voice to these women’s
experiences. The effect of the ethical and methodological obstacles we faced has therefore been to
reinforce functionalist and masculinist modes of knowledge production and to uphold the very
power relations that we sought to probe and trouble as feminist, qualitative researchers.
As Carol Cohn notes, the ‘dominant voice of militarized masculinity and decontextualized
rationality speaks so loudly in our culture, it will remain difficult for any other voices to be
heard until that voice loses some of its power to define what we hear’.148 Our article is thus a
147Email correspondence with MoD liaison officer, 7 May 2018.
148Cohn, ‘Sex and death’, pp. 717–18.























































































































cautionary tale to those seeking to contribute through critical methods and analysis to military
research in the context of the knowledge economy but also an invitation to do so. While our
experience was taxing, it remains vital that feminist researchers seek to elevate voices beyond
the malestream so that eventually, the power to define, be heard, and name the world becomes
more dispersed. In liberal democratic contexts like the UK, why we study security institutions,
how, whose voices we prioritise, and what we can say are crucial to ensuring meaningful
democratic oversight of martial power.
Scholars who continue to examine only what makes militaries function and how to make them
function ‘effectively’ are failing to further knowledge. In problematically reproducing the same
tired methodological approaches and accepted ways of contributing to the knowledge economy,
they impoverish our understanding of militaries, security, and contemporary international rela-
tions. We thus hope that while this paper is a cautionary tale, it also encourages more scholars to
prioritise producing knowledge about military power than producing knowledge for it.
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